Random and Speculative Thoughts Department:
Force versus Coercion
By Wendy McElroy
[email protected]
Exclusive to The Libertarian Enterprise
[Permission to reproduce and circulate is hereby granted as long as
it is not for commercial purposes and the full citation is provided.]
The non-initiation of force is the foundation of libertarianism,
but an interesting question adheres to this principle. From a purely
descriptive stance, initial force -- or, coercion -- may look
absolutely identical to reactionary force -- or, self defense. For
example, while walking down an alley, you might encounter a woman
being pinned against a brick wall by a burly man. She cries out to
you, "help me!" You do so, and she flees the scene. Only then do you
discover from the outraged man that the woman was a pickpocket and he
was retrieving his stolen property, using a minimum of force to do
so.
The brute appearance or physical description of the incident
tells you nothing about whether the man's use of force was defensive
or coercive. In other words, from a descriptive point of view, the
use of force was value free, and you imposed a mistaken assessment
upon it. Subjectively, of course, force is never value free because
it is always personally experienced as a disvalue by the recipient
who is made to act against his or her will -- otherwise it is not an
act of force. Likewise, force is personally experienced as a value to
the acting agent whose very pursuit of force indicates that he or she
desires/values it. And, then, there are murky encounters in which no
one is a clear victor and both parties view the struggle either as a
disvalue or value.
Thus, force -- even the initiation of force -- cannot be
subjectively valued as either good or bad, but rather as both good
and bad. Nor can any act be objectively valued by a third party
without some form of information over and above a mere physical
description. In other words, a third party cannot make the leap from
subjective evaluations to the objective conclusion that any act of
force is right or wrong. [Hereafter, I will refer to "wrong force" as
coercion.]
It is only through what Ayn Rand might call an intervening value
judgment that proper force can be distinguished from coercion. This
intermediate step allows the observer to move from the realm of
personal evaluation into that of principles by which to judge the
propriety of force.
Libertarianism has offered at least three standards by which to
make such a intervening value judgment.
The first is an argument from morality. In quasi-Randian form,
this argument runs: if life is of value and it is right for a human
beings to sustain their lives, then it is wrong for others to
interfere with that process by force. Since moral principles based on
human nature must be universalizable, this means that -- if you wish
to claim the protection of such a principle -- you must apply it to
others and desist from initiating force. Thus there is a moral
preference for proper or defensive force rather than for coercion.
The second is an argument from human happiness. This, again, is a
quasi-Randian approach: namely, there is a necessary and logical
hook-up between human beings acting on their own judgments and those
human beings having a chance to achieve happiness, which is defined
as a sense of emotional satisfaction. The hook-up is *not* that all
volitional acts will lead to a maximum of happiness. Any particular
act may be self-destructive or mistaken. You cannot move from X being
a voluntary act to it being a good act without an intervening value
judgment. And the best available value judgment is that of the acting
person, who knows their own goals, desires, and context. Even then, X
may not achieve happiness, but refusing to allow the person to use
their own judgment will definitely not achieve that goal.
"Life-boat" scenarios, such as pulling a suicide-minded person
off a high ledge, would seem to contradict this principle, but two
points can be made. The afore-argued is a general principle, which
should not be dismissed because it has "grey" areas, as all
principles do. Moreover, even such grey areas provide support in the
case, e.g., of a human being who *repeatedly* attempts suicide. To
such a person, life has become a disvalue and the happiest state he
or she might be capable of is oblivion. Remember, Rand's argument for
the value of life begins, "IF life is of value, then..." Her argument
is contextual. To one who no longer values life, happiness may lie in
ending it.
The third argument, which is the most specific to libertarianism,
is one from social order. Return to the situation of two people
battling, and an observer wondering who is using proper force and who
is exercising coercive. Again, an intervening value judgment is
required. For libertarians, the touchstone for that judgment is
property titles.
If the 19th century individualist-anarchist Benjamin Tucker was
correct, and property titles are the most principle by which to
resolve the dilemma of who can properly claim the use of goods in a
world of scarcity, then ascertaining where the property title is
vested tells you who is using defensive force and who is being
coercive. And, since the most fundamental form of property title is
self-ownership, no one can property initiate force against your
person. This claim to your body overrides a similar claim by any
other human being, if only because you are the only one who can
exercise the defining aspect of your "humanness" -- your rationality
and will. Your humanness is a machine that only you can operate.
The additional information about property titles introduces a
standard by which to transcend the subjective judgments that revolve
around an act of force. The observer can note the appearance of
force, and join it to a common sense principle of resolution that
furthers a social order. In short, he evolves a concept of force
that is socially wrong: namely, coercion. And the distinction between
proper force and coercion becomes: force is used in defense of
property titles, and coercion is used to assault them.
The above is not meant to be the definitive word on force and
coercion, but a springboard for discussion.
A contributing editor to Liberty magazine, Wendy McElroy has
published widely in feminism beginning in 1983 with Freedom,
Feminism and the State (CATO) and most recently in 1995 with XXX: A
Woman's Right to Pornography (St. Martin's Press). Her articles have
appeared in such diverse publications as National Review and
Penthouse. Her 'day' job is writing and editing documentaries, some
of which have been recorded by Walter Cronkite, George C. Scott and
Harry Reasoner.