The Only "Dangerous Wwapon" is the Human Mind, II
By Tom Creasing
[email protected]
Exclusive to The Libertarian Enterprise
In regard to
my debut piece in The Libertarian Enterprise, V.S. in
Nevada wrote:
"[T]his
thing reads like Part I.' Now, I'm waiting for: Part
II: If I'd been in charge of the church at Waco, and I expected a
federal assault, here's what I would have done.'"
I don't have
my dictionary of quotations to hand, but as I recall
some strategist once pointed out that battles and wars aren't won by
one side, they're lost by the other. In other words, he who gives up
first is the loser. The essence of war, then, is to schedule and
apply your resources so that the other side gives up first. It is
difficult to say exactly what resources victims at Waco might have
had, or what resources other intended victims might have, but for
purposes of this brief overview I will consider only those that they
were demonstrated to have or which would have been easily available.
Scheduling
(or strategy) consists of long range and short range
aspects, and a good scheduler takes both of those into account. During
the long range scheduling period you determine general considerations
(e.g. what you hope to accomplish, how you will go about it, what
tools you will need, how to acquire or substitute for them, etc.).
Short range strategy is that period of time after one of the instances
identified in your long range phase has manifested itself, and now you
begin tailoring your response and preparing applications.
Applications are, of course, the active conduct of your strategies.
My previous
article covered what I believed to be major failings
in the Waco victims' long range strategies. They demonstrably hadn't
really identified and considered their purposes, beyond establishing
an odd lifestyle, their acquisition of tools was haphazard and poorly
thought out, they had no prepared contingency plans beyond hunker down
and hope they'll go away, and their performance did not live up to
their advertising. As with many other things in life, they should
have solved this problem while it was small.
We've already
touched on many of the long range scheduling errors
they made. One that I hadn't mentioned was a failure to stockpile
other tools, including a broader variety of communications equipment.
Ceding their attackers control of the information flow was an
inexcusable error, both in the short range scheduling and application
phases.
In the short
range scheduling block, V.S. covered what he believed
they should have done, and here, lightly edited, is his exceedingly
well considered view:
"Call
the ATF. Ask if they're planning to come serve
a search warrant. Volunteer to arrange a meeting time for
two agents to come out. Once they've said they have no
interest, inform them this entire conversation is being
recorded. Ask them again if they'd like to come out for a
peaceful tour and cup of coffee. Tell them copies of this
tape will be going to the local sheriff, your lawyer, and
the local TV station, as evidence that you're willing to
bend over backwards to comply with the law. Ask them if
there's anything else bothering them."
Tool time.
Video cameras are a must in this modern TV addicted
age. People don't want to hear recordings with some still photo up in
the corner. They will be much more interested in someone sitting
calmly at a desk, talking to ATF agents on a speaker phone and
covering all the bases V.S. mentions. A couple of highly visible kids
("Say hi to the nice ATF man, sweetie.") obviously at ease in their
surroundings wouldn't hurt, either.
Another set
of tools would be ham radios and CBs, especially if
the former incorporate Slow Scan TV capabilities, all the better to
get your pictures to the networks and public at large. Cell phones,
especially if hooked up to computers and thence to the Internet, would
also fit into this information category. Remember that the First
Amendment is first for a reason -- timely information (or the control
thereof) can be worth crates of ammunition and bundles of rifles.
Loudspeakers can be a good investment as well, as we'll see in
applications.
Yet another
tool is personal connections. The more friends and
associates you have, the greater the number of people who will raise a
fuss in the media if you're assaulted, the better off you are. These
are also people who can help get out information and videos to other
sources to ensure maximum exposure. Yes, there may be something
attractive about the self sufficient exile from society lifestyle --
but you can see where that got Randy Weaver.
V.S. goes
on to point out, with obvious skill:
Only
then might one want to talk about digging
flanking, communicating trenches, digging pits or erecting
concrete barricades in the driveway and to protect internal
living quarters, maintaining a constant, rotating, long-range
scout-sniper patrol with orders to locate and take out enemy
command and communication facilities upon the sound of any
full-scale armed engagement from their rear, the relative
merits of 12-gauge buckshot as opposed to black-tip 30.06,
etc.
The government
has said, over and over again, that the ATF clowns
at Waco were "ambushed." Wouldn't it be interesting to even do Part II
as an interview? Call two military gents with some experience at
"ambush," which is a fairly specific military term. Like, maybe,
SEALS. Give them a scenario: you know 70 enemy troops, well-equipped
(including hot, bulky Kevlar) but not very well trained, and without
much real esprit de corps, are going to be piling out of a cattle
trailer in broad daylight sometime soon, rushing your front door and
erecting scaling ladders. Here's the manpower and weaponry you have
available. Draw up a plan which -- with 30 minutes notice -- will
result in maximum enemy casualties, and minimal friendly losses.
Estimate enemy casualties after 90 minutes.
Suggesting
this particular analysis has merit, although there are
plenty of books out there that will provide far more depth and detail
than we would want use in this limited space available here.
Additionally, in the seamless web of things, I would have little
difficulty, given 30 minutes warning and the Waco victims resources,
organizing an ambush that would guarantee, as close as is humanly
possible, 100% casualties in the advancing light infantry unit. What,
though, do you do about the mechanized infantry and armor units that
follow? Seems like we're back to long range scheduling again, and yet
more planning required.
Thomas J. Creasing is an attorney for the Young Wha Consulting
Corporation Korea Press Center, 8th Fl. 25, 1-Ka, Taepyung-Ro
Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea 100-745. Short Address: KPO Box 106, Seoul
110-601, Korea. Direct Line: +82 (2) 3700-6881. Fax: +82 (2) 738-2538.
E-mail: [email protected]