Pragmatists vs. Ideologues
Achieving A Free Society: Good News and Bad
By George H. Smith
[email protected]
Special to The Libertarian Enterprise
PART TWO
We also have
the pragmatic activist who shares the businessman's
disdain for ideologues and believes that he, too, has his finger on
the pulse of people in the real world. Radical ideas and causes,
according to this activist, will alienate our potential supporters,
many of whom are disenchanted by traditional politics. Therefore, we
are cautioned not to focus on unpopular issues, such as drug
legalization.
There are
many variations and permutations of pragmatism, some of
which are more sophisticated than the types presented here, but all
share a dislike of abstract arguments and ideologues. When the
libertarian pragmatist speak of "facts" and the "real world," he means
the knowledge gained through experience and observation, knowledge
acquired from specific events and circumstances. He begins with
empirical facts (concrete people, specific actions, etc.) and then
generalizes about strategy, based on what libertarians can
realistically hope to achieve in the near future.
This inductive
process is based on the historical method. All
facts appealed to by the pragmatist (assuming they are accurate) fall
within the domain of historical knowledge. History is the study of
past human actions; it is concerned with the unique individual event,
not with a general pattern or theory. These historical events are
what the pragmatists call the "real world" of facts.
Ironically,
the pragmatist sometimes places history in the same
category as theory, relegating both to the ethereal world of the
ideologue, scholar and academic. Yet, as Mises and others have
pointed out, all human knowledge falls into one of these two
categories. Knowledge of particular concrete facts is always
knowledge of something that has already taken place; this is
historical knowledge. General knowledge, on the other hand, does not
refer to a specific time and place; this is theoretical
knowledge. All knowledge refers either to specific phenomena that
occurred at a determinate time and place in the past, or to general
propositions that are abstracted from any particular time and
place. The former is the sphere of history; the latter is the sphere
of theory.
The pragmatist
commits himself to a strategic method based on
history instead of theory. This is a plausible choice, provided the
pragmatist understands the method he is using, especially its
limitations. But this rarely happens. The pragmatist who disdains
theory fails thereby to reflect on the theoretical premises and
implications of his own method, which remain unacknowledged,
unappreciated, and often ill-treated. I will discuss three aspects of
this problem.
(1) The
failure to analyze methodological assumptions is clearly
illustrated by the mole-like historical sight of some pragmatists who,
in their search for empirical data, search no farther than their
immediate range of vision. History, for the mole, is limited to what
he has personally witnessed or at least to events that have occurred
during recent decades. For the mole, history began a decade ago,
possibly two or three, but rarely does the mole regard as relevant any
event that is older than he is. His life and memory, it seems, just
happen to overlap perfectly with the only period of history that he
needs to know. By a convenient coincidence, all relevant facts
pertaining to a free society and how to achieve it are confined to the
same period of time during which the pragmatist has been interested in
libertarianism.
Given his
commitment to the real world, the pragmatist should
immerse himself in a study of the real world (i.e., history) and learn
what factors have contributed to freedom over the past 2500
years. Modern libertarians are not the first people to value liberty,
nor are we the most successful. Seventeenth and eighteenth century
libertarians, for example, faced even greater odds than we do, yet
they had spectacular triumphs in some areas, such as religious
freedom. These successes were not accidental. Early libertarians
were acutely aware of strategic issues -- witness the popular appeal
of the Enlightenment philosophes -- yet most would be considered
"ideologues" by the modern pragmatist. Indeed, the very word
"ideologue" was apparently coined by the pragmatic Napoleon, who used
it to smear Benjamin Constant and other French libertarians who
refused to sacrifice principles to expediency.
I agree
with the pragmatist that we should be concerned with what
will work in the real world. But this requires that we learn
something about the real world, which is far more complex than the
mole would have us believe. If we want to know what will work,we
should find out what has worked in the past. Therefore, the sincere
pragmatist, before he trashes ideologues, should study history for at
least ten years, reflect on what he has read, and then get back to
us.
(2) The
most serious error of pragmatism is its lack of
appreciation for the role of ideology in social perception. By
"social perception," is meant how we "perceive" the world of social
wholes (or entities), such as "state," "society," "church," and "the
market." In truth, we do not perceive social entities with our eyes;
rather, we understand them with our minds. Social entities, as
Hayek says, are "constituted" by the mind. They are not physical
things, like rocks and trees and birds, but are mental constructs of
abstract relationships.
This means
that how we think about social entities will greatly
influence how we perceive them. We libertarians know this from
experience, having encountered many people who appear to "see"
government differently than we do. Some people don't see government
as essentially coercive; they may even see taxes as "voluntary." These
differences in social perception result from viewing social reality
through different ideological lenses. Ideology is absolutely
essential to the success of the libertarian movement, because it
establishes a common frame of reference. If we fail to convince the
average person, this is often because we see a different social
reality than does the average person. Before we can convince other
people, we must refer to the same social world.
Contrary to
the pragmatist, the real world of social interaction
is not a world of objective data and physical entities. It is a
subjective world, one that is filtered through ideological
assumptions, premises, and prejudices. The social world is
constituted by the ideas that people have about it. If libertarians
can change those ideas, they can, in a very literal sense, change the
world.
(3) In
evaluating any form of pragmatism, we should keep in mind
that the greatest benefits of a free society are often those that
cannot be foreseen or predicted. As Hayek points out, this has
important implications for any pragmatic strategy.
"Since the
value of freedom rests on the opportunities it provides
for unforeseen and unpredictable actions, we will rarely know what we
lose through a particular restriction of freedom." (Law, Legislation,
and Liberty, Vol.I, p.56)
The direct
effects of market intervention will be apparent in many
cases, but we cannot know all the opportunities that have been lost
through such intervention. This means that liberty will tend to lose
out in any cost-benefit analysis -- because the benefits of
intervention can be "seen," while the costs (the unrealized
opportunities) remain largely "unseen." Consequently, whenever policy
decisions are based on expediency instead of principle, "freedom is
bound to be sacrificed in almost every instance." Hayek continues:
"The preservation
of a free system is so difficult precisely
because it requires a constant rejection of measures which appear to
be required to secure particular results, on no stronger grounds than
that they conflict with a general rule, and frequently without our
knowing what will be the costs of not observing the rule in the
particular instance. A successful defense of freedom must therefore
be dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency .... Freedom will
prevail only if it is accepted as a general principle whose
application to particular instances requires no justification."
(Ibid., p.61.)
INTELLECTUALS AND PUBLIC OPINION
Hayek's essay,
"The Intellectuals and Socialism", is a superb
discussion of the role of intellectuals in modern society, the
reasons for their attraction to socialism, and why they have generally
found classical liberal (i.e., libertarian) ideas to be unappealing.
Although some points in this essay may not be as relevant today as
when they were first published in 1949 -- for example, a smaller
percentage of modern intellectuals probably favor outright socialism
than when Hayek was writing, while a greater percentage have embraced
libertarianism -- Hayek's general insights remain highly suggestive
and useful for the modern movement.
"The Intellectuals and Socialism"
presents nothing less than a
strategic vision for achieving a free society; it is a compelling case
for the indispensable role of abstract principles and a systematic
theory of liberty. Though Hayek is not usually regarded as a
strategic thinker, this essay demonstrates in theory what his role in
establishing the Mont Pelerin Society demonstrated in practice --
namely, that F.A. Hayek was perhaps the most brilliant and successful
strategist in the modern revival of classical liberalism.
Because the
meaning of "intellectual" is rather vague, and because
the word sometimes carries a negative connotation, it is important to
understand at the outset what Hayek means by the word.
For Hayek,
an intellectual is a "professional secondhand dealer in
ideas." By this Hayek does not intend to disparage the intelligence,
knowledge, or significance of intellectuals. Intellectuals can be
highly intelligent or rather stupid, wise or foolish, knowledgeable or
ignorant, quick-witted or dull, original or hackneyed. By
"second-hand," Hayek means second in the order of the transmission of
knowledge -- a mediator between the expert and the general public.
Therefore Hayek defines the intellectual in terms of his public
function -- or social role, as sociologists would say -- in the
dissemination of specialized knowledge to a wider audience; he is an
"intermediary in the spreading of ideas."
The intellectual
is distinguished by Hayek from the expert -- the
specialist, scholar or original thinker in a particular field of
knowledge. This does not mean that intellectuals cannot be experts,
or vice versa, but insofar as the specialist addresses not just fellow
specialists but the public at large, he is functioning in the dual
roles of expert and intellectual. Though the roles of the expert and
the intellectual are often embodied in different persons, this need
not be the case.
This concept
of the intellectual encompasses many professionals,
including journalists, teachers, novelists, ministers, and even
cartoonists and artists who convey ideas through their work. Also
included are various professionals and technicians, such as scientists
and doctors, who, because of the respect they command in their own
areas of expertise, are taken seriously in other fields. Essentially,
therefore, intellectuals are those who deal with ideas that are taken
from other sources; they are secondhanders, in contrast to experts,
who are firsthanders.
[To Be Continued]
George H. Smith's articles and essays have appeared in many
publications, including the New York Times, Reason, Liberty, and
Free Inquiry. He currently conducts classes and seminars on Ludwig
von Mises, Ayn Rand and other libertarian thinkers for Resources for
Independent Thinking, a foundation headed by libertarian psychologist
Sharon Presley. RIT, 484 Lake Park Ave., #24, Oakland, CA 94610-2730,
510-601-9450 (voice), 510-547-7140 (fax), [email protected] (e-mail).
This article was first delivered as the keynote address at the
Libertarian Party of California's state convention in Sacramento
February 15, 1997 and is reprinted from the International Society for
Individual Liberty's Freedom Network News No. 48 (March 1997).